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FOREWORD
We are pleased to present Cities and State Fiscal Structures, a report developed and published in collaboration with our partners, the state municipal leagues. The state 
municipal leagues occupy a special position within the National League of Cities. They were 
the founding members of NLC in 1924 and continue to play an important role, guiding the 
organization’s priorities and serving as an important link to cities in their state.
Cities and State Fiscal Structures is the first report in a research collaborative between NLC 
and the state municipal leagues. On an annual basis we will be working together to develop 
research that is important and valuable for both groups, and America’s cities. 
This year’s research on the city-state fiscal relationship builds on NLC’s 30 year history of 
leadership on city finance. Our annual City Fiscal Conditions research surveys city finance 
officers on finance trends, challenges and conditions, collecting both actual general fund 
information, as well as qualitative data about the insights and opinions of these community 
leaders. 
The purpose of Cities and State Fiscal Structures is to provide a comparative assessment 
of state and local fiscal systems, including taxing authority, revenue reliance and capacity, 
state aid, and tax and expenditure limits. The goal is provide data and research that support 
efforts to enhance cities’ tools to better meet the fiscal needs of their communities.  
Looking to the future, we are excited to continue the research partnership with the state 
municipal leagues in order to jointly assist cities and towns across the country. Within 
NLC’s Center for City Solutions and Applied Research we strive to strengthen communities, 
transform and improve cities and assist city leaders. This partnership allows us all to build 
upon our strengths and provide the needed resources to cities across the country to build a 
stronger America from the ground up.  
Brooks Rainwater    
Director, Center for City Solutions and Applied Research
National League of Cities 
Clarence E. Anthony  
CEO and Executive Director 
National League of Cities  
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INTRODUCTION
More than seven years following the start of the Great Recession, cities’ fiscal health is finally beginning the slow climb to recovery.  City finance officers are more 
optimistic about their cities’ ability to meet fiscal needs, local workforces are growing, and 
revenues are improving.  The local fiscal outlook continues to be constrained, however, by 
increases in service costs, long-term infrastructure needs, employee wages, and pension and 
healthcare obligations. (1)
State actions to balance their budgets are adding to cyclical pressures that cities are 
confronting. These actions include cuts in general aid, cuts in state-shared and/or state-
collected revenues, revocation or reduction of reimbursement programs or other transfers, 
cuts in funding for services that cities and other local governments deliver on behalf of 
state governments, transfer of state program responsibility, and reductions or limits to local 
taxing authority.  During economic downturns, the decisions that state leaders make to 
balance budgets often exacerbate the effects of the downturn on other levels of government, 
employment, and the quality of life and well-being of individuals and communities. 
Conversely, state fiscal systems have the potential to create an environment that is 
conducive to economic vitality. This is particularly the case at the sub- state, or local and 
regional, levels where the units of government are corporations of state government and 
local fiscal structure is largely determined by state governments. To ensure economic vitality, 
state fiscal systems should provide sufficient fiscal autonomy for localities to fund their share 
of resident needs. In addition, states should take steps to support local fiscal capacity and 
minimize fiscal inequities among local governments. The academic literature on state-local 
fiscal policy indicates that greater flexibility on the part of the localities, given appropriate 
controls by the state, tends to be superior fiscal policy.
This report examines state-local fiscal structures and the way in which state fiscal regimes do 
or do not create a fiscal environment that makes it difficult for municipalities to effectively 
fund their own activities – including those that contribute to economic development at the 
local and regional levels. (2)
Our analysis is organized around two critical concepts. The first concept focuses on 
state fiscal structures and the extent to which states restrict the scope of fiscal control of 
municipal governments. The second concept, related to the first in that it recognizes the 
nesting of local governments within state structures, explores other arenas of state authority 
that limit or expand the fiscal capacity of municipal governments. Within these two 
concepts, we examine four criteria:
1. Municipal fiscal authority, which refers to state’s proscribing and granting access 
to general taxes, that is, a general tax on sales, income, and property; 
1. Christiana McFarland and 
Michael A. Pagano, City Fiscal 
Conditions in 2014, National 
League of Cities, Washington, 
DC.
2. We use the terms “cities” and 
“municipalities” broadly to refer 
to all municipal governments.
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2. Municipal revenue reliance and capacity, which refers to the proportion of total 
revenues that a municipality generates from its own-sources, thus determining the 
ability of the municipality to control the majority of its revenues;
3. State aid, or the amount of state support for a municipality as a proportion of its 
total revenues; and 
4. The existence of tax and spending limits, which constrain local fiscal autonomy 
by requiring that local governments tax or spend according to state regulations. 
Any analysis of state-local fiscal structures should begin with a caveat about the wide 
variation that exists. Because states largely determine the structure, there are in essence fifty 
different state-local fiscal systems in the United States. Within those fifty systems lie distinct 
sets of rules for different levels of government – municipalities, counties, towns, townships, 
villages, etc. – at which point the variation spreads from 50 states to 19,000 municipalities, 
16,000 towns and villages, and 4,000 counties. The capacity for variation, therefore, makes 
analysis difficult, context important, and some level of generalization necessary for the sake 
of comparison.
A key distinction to acknowledge at the outset is that the function of public education, a 
required service in all states, is not organized in a uniform manner. The majority of states 
utilize systems where schools are governed through an independent level of government 
– school districts. However, some states make schools a dependent service provided by 
general purpose local governments – either as a function of incorporated municipalities or 
as a county responsibility. (3) The handling of education, perhaps the most significant of 
state-local services from the public’s perspective, is important within the analysis presented 
below, as those counties or municipalities in states in which schools are dependent 
local government services tend to be more reliant upon local property taxes, less fiscally 
autonomous, and more dependent upon state aid.
Despite the tremendous variation, our analysis attempts some comparison of state-local 
fiscal systems across the four criteria noted above.
Throughout the report we make distinctions among states about whether they appear to 
be “ahead of the pack,” “with the pack,” or “behind the pack” in terms of where they sit 
relative to other states on each of the four evaluated criteria. The distinctions in each case 
are referring to the states’ treatment of, or structure for, their respective municipalities.  
These distinctions are subjective and are based on normative assumptions we make about 
the components of a preferred state-local structure.
3. These states include Alaska, 
Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
York, Rhode Island, Tennessee, 
and Virginia.
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MUNICIPAL FISCAL AUTHORITY
We first examine the tax authority of municipal governments. Our normative position 
is that more local authority is better. Because the underlying composition of any local 
government’s economic base varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, we contend that local 
governments know how best to match their revenue-raising tools to the underlying economy. 
Imposing a uniform revenue and tax structure by the state ignores the within-state variation 
of local governments’ economic bases and of their diverse spending needs. Although “more 
local authority is better” in an abstract sense, local governments must also examine the 
administrative costs prior to adopting or expanding revenue and taxing authority. If the 
transaction costs exceed the revenue-generating potential of a certain tax, even if that tax 
matches the economic base of the local government, it certainly would not be a recommended 
policy option. In addition, while our normative position is that more local authority is desired, 
the state may need to structure local authority to encourage uniformity and simplicity in local 
tax systems.
We examine the three major sources of state and local tax revenue – the property tax, sales tax, 
and income tax. We rate municipalities as having authority if they have an option to levy the 
tax, local option to control the tax rate (within some increment; they have some ability to shift 
the rate) and if the revenues are for general use (e.g., not earmarked for specific uses) (see table 
1 in appendix).
The most fiscally autonomous municipalities would, therefore, be allowed a local option for all 
three tax sources and the revenues from those sources would all be for general use. We come 
to this position based on the assumption that local governments are in the best position to 
ascertain both the benefits of a diverse revenue-raising toolkit and the costs of implementing 
such tax policies.
No state uniformly authorizes its municipalities to utilize all three tax sources. States are 
deemed to be “ahead of the pack” if they have access to at least two sources and a third 
source for some jurisdictions. For example, municipalities in Alabama have access to a local 
option property tax and sales tax, and a local option occupation tax, or income tax, paid by 
those working in municipalities that opt to use the tax. Special tax options for individual 
municipalities are provided in Missouri (income tax for Kansas City and St. Louis), New York 
(income tax for New York City and Yonkers), and Pennsylvania (sales tax for Philadelphia). 
1. MUNICIPAL FISCAL AUTHORITY
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Even though this state grant of authority does not extend to all municipalities, these local 
governments represent a substantial population group (New York City’s population amounts 
to more than half the state’s; Philadelphia is the largest municipality in Pennsylvania). 
Arkansas technically provides a local option income tax for municipalities, in addition to a 
local property and sales tax, but the income tax option is rarely, if ever, used.
Although municipalities in Ohio, Kentucky and Washington have access to only two revenue 
sources, we place them in the “ahead of the pack” group because of the broad base of their 
non-property taxes. For Ohio’s and Kentucky’s municipalities, they are permitted to tax 
personal income at both the place of employment and the place of business, making their 
income taxes a ‘commuter’ tax as well as a tax on residents. Moreover, they are authorized to 
tax business profits at the same rate as individual income. The base, therefore, is substantial. 
Washington’s municipalities are authorized to impose a “business and occupancy” tax which 
is a tax on all businesses (including services) that perform work or sell services within the 
jurisdiction and on all incomes that are derived from working within the municipality. 
Although the rate is low, the revenues derived from the B&O tax are substantial. In other 
words, the B&O tax operates much like a broad-based sales tax, including services, and 
income tax. (4)
States are grouped as “with the pack” if their municipal governments have access to two 
tax sources. A property-sales tax mix is the combination found for municipalities in most 
states. For example, municipalities in Kansas can use a local property tax and a local sales tax. 
Notable exceptions are found in Michigan and Delaware where some form of local income 
tax-like option is provided in addition to a local property tax.
Note: In some cases, the state 
may not provide authority to all 
municipalities. For notes about 
special circumstances, cases, and 
provisions by state, see table 1 in 
the appendix.
Property + Sales 
+ Income
Property + Sales or 
Income
Property or Sales 
Only
4. Local income taxes, as we 
refer to them here, are not 
always referred to as income 
taxes by the individual states. 
In Kentucky, for instance, cities 
and counties levy two income 
related taxes, an occupational 
license tax on income earned in 
a jurisdiction by individuals and 
a net profits tax on businesses.
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Michigan is a special case in the “with the pack” group because the largest municipality in the 
state, Detroit, is authorized to levy a tax on income for both residents and commuters. The 
‘base’, consequently, is broader and in line with good fiscal policy which taxes users of services 
and not just residents.
States receive “behind the pack” ratings when their municipalities have access to one or no 
local tax source. For example, municipalities in many New England states only have access to 
a local property tax. The property tax is the lone local source in almost all instances for these 
states, except for Oklahoma where the only local general purpose tax revenues come from 
a sales tax. (5) Several states in this category provide very limited authority for a second tax 
source and we include them in this “behind the pack” category as a result. For example, “resort 
cities” in Idaho with populations less than 10,000 may levy a local sales tax. Although we 
place Arizona in the “with the pack” category, it is also a special case in that several cities are 
not authorized to levy a property tax for any purpose without a vote of the electorate. Mesa, 
Arizona, for example, with a population of approximately 400,000, is the largest municipality 
in the nation without access to the property tax. (6)
5. Oklahoma’s municipalities 
can levy a property tax for debt 
service.
6. Requiring voter approval for 
the use of non-property local 
option taxes, particularly sales 
taxes, is a much more common 
practice.
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MUNICIPAL REVENUE RELIANCE & CAPACITY 
We also examine the share of general fund revenues derived from local sources, including 
major taxes (property, sales, income) and charges (since fees and charges are usually set 
locally). (7) This “own-source capacity” measure gauges whether local fiscal policy decisions 
can actually determine the fiscal direction of their municipality. (8) 
Within own-source capacity, a mix of elastic and inelastic revenue sources is needed to 
provide municipalities with stability to buffer against economic downturns, and to allow 
them to capture revenue growth during periods of economic growth. (9) Generally, property 
tax revenues are considered more inelastic or less responsive to economic changes, mainly 
because it takes deeper, longer-term economic shifts to impact housing values, which 
determine property tax collections, as well as because of assessment practices. Assessment 
practices vary in large part because of the inexact science of estimating the value of land 
and property until the property is exchanged on the market. Sales and income taxes are 
considered more elastic because consumer sales and personal income are quicker to respond 
to economic shifts. 
Municipal revenue reliance is the extent to which municipal governments rely upon these 
three major tax sources as a share of general revenues (see table 2 in appendix). The most 
fiscally stable municipalities in the U.S. are those relying on revenues from two tax sources, 
plus a third source for municipalities with a substantial share of the state population (the 
two major municipalities in Missouri – Kansas City and St. Louis – and the largest city in 
New York – New York City).
Due to political challenges and other restrictions on local taxes, fees and charges have 
become an increasing proportion of local revenues. Revenues from “fees, charges and 
miscellaneous” include administrative and court fees, waste disposal fees, building 
permits, development impact fees, law enforcement and fire fees, and services such as 
libraries and parks.
On average, U.S. municipalities derive approximately 71% of their general fund revenues 
from own-source revenues, including 24% from property taxes, 13% from sales taxes, 3% 
from income taxes and 32% from fees and charges. 
2. MUNICIPAL REVENUE RELIANCE & CAPACITY 
7. “General revenue” as 
defined by the U.S. Census 
of Governments, including all 
local revenues except revenues 
from utilities and liquor store 
operations.  This definition is 
broader than how states and 
cities budget, in which the 
“general fund” is the annual 
operating budget, with a series 
of other funds for special 
activities/projects. 
8. Our measure of “own-source 
revenue capacity” differs from 
a commonly used census 
definition of “own-source 
revenues” in that local revenues 
are not counted as own source if 
there is no local authority (using 
our definition of authority based 
on a local option that can be 
used for general purposes). 
9. The data on local revenues 
by state utilized to assess local 
revenue reliance are from the 
U.S. Census of Governments, 
covering FY2012, the most 
current year available to date.







States found to be “ahead of the pack” are those where total municipal own-source capacity 
is more than one standard deviation (11%) above the mean (71%). (10)
We identify two sets of “with the pack” states where the own-source capacity of 
municipalities is clustered around the mean. The first group is comprised of those states 
above the mean. Not surprisingly many of these states are two-tax source states, with Maine 
being one exception in this list due to its broad property tax base. A second group of states 
contains those where the municipalities’ own-source capacity is below the mean. 
Lastly, “behind the pack” states are those where municipalities’ own-source capacity is 
more than one standard deviation below the mean. Most of the states where schools are 
dependent parts of local governments can be found in the below-the-mean “with the pack or 
“behind the pack” categories.
10. Measured as one standard 
deviation above the mean 
capacity (% share of general 
revenue). Throughout the report 
we generally used the mean 
and standard deviation statistics 
to determine break points for 
differences among states. 
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STATE AID
Another way that the fiscal capacity of municipalities is increased is through state aid. While 
it could be argued that too much state aid makes municipalities beholden to the state, in 
general, well-structured state aid increases the overall capacity of municipal governments 
and in many instances provides a level of equalization and base support for municipalities 
that may lack other resources. State aid to school districts, for example, often utilizes 
an equalization formula to ensure that the states meet court-required responsibilities 
for providing an ‘adequate’ or ‘foundation’ support to school children. For general- 
purpose local governments, however, states provide aid for a host of reasons, including 
redistributional purposes, general government support, and other reasons that enhance the 
fiscal capacity of the recipient governments. 
We measure state aid as the share of general revenue from state sources (direct state aid), 
regardless of intent (see table 3 in appendix). We also distribute states according to their 
ranking based on the mean (17%) and standard deviation (10%) for state aid.
States that appear to be “ahead of the pack” are those where the municipalities’ share of general 








Note: For percent of revenues 
from each source by state, see 
table 3 in appendix.
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grouping are mainly those where the municipalities have dependent schools, plus Wyoming 
because the state distributes its oil severance taxes to municipalities.
“With the pack” states are those where the share of general revenue from state aid is clustered 
within one standard deviation of the mean, which we separated into two groups, those above 
and below the mean.  As with previous measures, “behind the pack” states are those where the 
share of general revenue from state aid is more than one standard deviation below the mean.
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TAX AND EXPENDITURE LIMITS (TELS)
Another way that state and local tax systems are constrained in significant ways is through 
voter- or state-imposed (constitutional or statutory) tax and expenditure limitations, often 
referred to, in short, as TELs. There are two types of TELs that we examine here – those 
that constrain the property tax in particular and those that constrain overall revenue 
spending increases.
At the local level, the most common TELs affect local governments’ property taxes, while 
general revenue and spending limits are less common. Within property tax limitations, there 
are other important distinctions that we use based on different types of limits. Three types of 
property tax limits exist: those that seek to cap the property tax rate; those that seek to limit 
growth in local property assessments; and those that seek to limit the total levy (revenue) 
growth from property taxes from year to year. 
Not all of these types of limits are individually binding in that a rate limit alone might be 
circumvented by raising assessments, or an assessment limit alone might be circumvented 
by raising the property tax rate. We therefore make a distinction between relatively “less (or 
non-) binding” and “potentially binding” property tax limits. Potentially binding limits are 
those in which there is either a levy limit (because it caps the bottom line level at which the 
levy might increase) or some combination of rate and assessment limits together, thereby 
negating the ability of localities to circumvent the limits.
General revenue and spending limits are considered potentially binding on their own since 
they create caps on revenue and/or spending growth. (11) Thirty-four of 50 states have 
potentially binding limits in place for municipalities, indicating the prevalence of TELs 
among municipal governments across the country (see table 4 in appendix).
We identify two “ahead of the pack” groups of states with respect to TELs and 
municipalities. The most “ahead” group is comprised of states where there are no TELs 
(property or general).  Interestingly, several of the more fiscally constrained New England 
states, such as Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Vermont, are found in this group due 
to the absence of TELs. The lesser “ahead” group is comprised of those states where a less 
binding property tax limit is in place for municipal governments. 
4. TAX AND EXPENDITURE LIMITS (TELS)
11. This less (or non-) binding-
potential binding approach 
is well-documented within 
the academic and analytical 
literature on TELs. For instance, 
see Mullins and Wallin in Public 
Budgeting in Finance (2005). 
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States in the “with the pack” group all have a potentially binding property tax limit in place for 
municipal governments (either a levy limit, or a combination tax rate-assessment limit(s)).
“Behind the pack” states have both a potentially binding property tax limit for municipal 
governments and a general revenue or expenditure limit that applies to municipal 
governments. In other words, these are states where municipalities face the most significant 






Binding property tax 
limit + general limit
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SUMMARY
Some sense of groupings of states into “ahead of the pack” and “behind the pack” is possible 
based on their relative positions on each of the four criteria. There are more states that appear 
to be “behind the pack” than there are states that appear to be “ahead of the pack,” and even for 
the latter group there are usually qualifications, such as provisions of local authority for a few 
selected local governments.
Several states stand out as “ahead of the pack.” The states of Alabama and Missouri both 
provide some municipalities with a higher level of local authority, namely by allowing Alabama 
municipalities and Missouri’s two largest municipalities authorization to levy an income tax in 
addition to the local property and sales tax. More local authority is, however, offset by low levels 
of state aid relative to other states and, for Missouri, a potentially binding TEL also figures into 
the mix. New York and Pennsylvania also appear to be ahead of the pack. Although New York 
has a potentially binding TEL, the state does provide additional local authority to a significant 
sector of the state’s population through granting New York City and Yonkers the authority to 
levy income taxes. Similarly, Pennsylvania provides some additional local authority through the 
sales tax provided to Philadelphia (no other municipality in the state is permitted to levy a sales 
tax), its state aid level is particularly high, but it has a potentially binding TEL.
Municipalities in Ohio, Kentucky and Washington are also placed in the “ahead of the pack” 
category due to their broad-based tax bases. Moreover, even though all three operate under 
“potentially binding” property tax limitations, the effect is in large part mitigated by the broad 
tax base. In this regard, municipalities in these states are less likely to adjust tax or assessment 
issues because the tax bases are flexible and broad. Municipalities in states whose tax bases are 
narrow might be inclined to adjust their revenues by tinkering with the property tax system; the 
municipalities in these three states have more options. Hence, we place them in the “ahead of 
the pack” group.
Our assessment of “behind the pack” municipalities places considerable weight on local 
authority and reliance in combination with low ratings on one of the other factors. For 
example, a group of states are characterized by low authority and reliance in combination with 
a potentially binding TEL (Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Rhode Island). 
Another set of states are characterized by low levels of authority, reliance, and state aid (North 
Carolina, Oregon) or low levels of authority, reliance, and capacity (Connecticut and New 
Hampshire). West Virginia perhaps has the most constrained combination, with low levels of 
authority, reliance, state aid, and the presence of a potentially binding TEL.
SUMMARY
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CONCLUSION
Compared with the 2008 analysis of cities and state fiscal structures, the lack of change in each 
of the four structure components is striking given radical economic shifts that have ensued, 
but not wholly unexpected. Local fiscal health remains below pre-recession levels despite 
burgeoning broader economic recovery in part because authorization of more local revenue 
authority and other enhanced capacity measures to allow cities to leverage local economic 
vitality are rare.  The policy implications of this analysis of state-local fiscal structure, therefore, 
are straightforward:  
	 Expand local tax authority; 
	 Allow a mix of elastic and inelastic revenue sources to provide municipalities with 
stability to buffer against economic downturns, and to allow them to capture revenue 
growth during periods of economic growth;
	 Provide well-structured state aid to increase the overall capacity of municipal 
governments and provide a level of equalization and base support for municipalities 
that may lack other resources; and 
	 Resist providing tax relief by undermining local fiscal capacity, look to the economic 
ramifications and unintended consequences for those states where TELs are most 
restrictive, and change the structure of TELs already passed (easier for statutory TELs 
than those permanently enshrined in state constitutions) so that they are less binding, 
or even temporarily suspended.
The four criteria utilized in this analysis provide a useful framework for comparing the relative 
strength and weaknesses of state-local fiscal systems.  Although this analysis does not assess the 
state regulatory environment (which, coupled with structure, offers a fuller picture of capacity 
that state rules and systems provide for municipal governments), prior research indicates that 
pro-cyclical state fiscal actions, such as unfunded mandates, are also on the rise.  Additionally, 
economic downturns can lead to cuts in state aid and attempts to provide statewide tax relief 
that often further constrain local authority.  As a result of these state actions, as well the 
political challenges of raising local tax rates, municipalities continue to turn to user fees and 
charges to support their activities and provide services. The regressive nature of these fees, 
coupled with rapid changes in sources of growth in the economy, demand that states’ policies 
change to give cities the tools they need to better meet the fiscal needs of their communities.
CONCLUSION
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CONCLUSION
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State # of Sources Notes
Alabama 3 Property, sales, income (19 cities)
Alaska 2 Property, sales
Arizona 2 Property (with voter approval), sales
Arkansas 3 Property, sales, income (not used by any municipality)
California 2 Property, sales
Colorado 2 Property, sales
Connecticut 1 Property
Delaware 1 Property, income (Wilmington only)
Florida 1 Property
Georgia 2 Property, sales
Hawaii 1 Property (Honolulu is only municipality in Hawaii)
Idaho 1 Property (sales for resort cities <10,000 pop.)
Illinois 2 Property, sales
Indiana 2 Property, income
Iowa 2 Property, sales
Kansas 2 Property, sales
Kentucky 2 Income, property
Louisiana 2 Property, sales
Maine 1 Property
Maryland 1 Property, income (Baltimore city-county only)
Massachusetts 1 Property
Michigan 2 Property, income (22 cities)
Minnesota 2 Property, sales (some cities, if approved by State Leg.)
Mississippi 1 Property
Missouri 3 Property, sales, income (Kansas City & St. Louis only)
Montana 1 Property (sales for resort cities <5,500 pop.)
Nebraska 2 Property, sales
Nevada 1 Property
New Hampshire 1 Property
New Jersey 1 Property (sales for Atlantic City, Wildwoods only)
New Mexico 2 Property, sales
New York 3 Property, sales, income (New York City & Yonkers only)
North Carolina 1 Property
North Dakota 2 Property, sales
Ohio 2 Income, property
Oklahoma 1 Sales (property only for debt service)
Oregon 1 Property
Pennsylvania 2 Property, income, sales (Philadelphia only)
Rhode Island 1 Property
South Carolina 1 Property
South Dakota 2 Property, sales
Tennessee 2 Property, sales
Texas 2 Property, sales
Utah 2 Property, sales
Vermont 1 Property (some sales)
Virginia 2 Property, sales
Washington 3 Property, sales, B&O (business income) tax
West Virginia 1 Property
Wisconsin 1 Property
Wyoming 1 Property
1. Local income taxes, as referred to here, are not always labeled as income taxes in the individual states. In Kentucy, for 
instance, cities and counties levy two income-related taxes, an occupational license tax on income earned in a jurisdiction 
by individuals and a net profits tax on businesses. 2. Cities are rated as having authority if they have a local option to 
control the tax rate (or within some increment they have the abiltiy to shift the rate) and if the revenues are for general 
use. 3. Groups in Table 1B are based on the number of sources. In some cases, special authority to levy a particular tax 
is granted to a small number of jurisdictions and not for all cities. In these instances, states are grouped in a category 
based on whether the authority covers a sizeable share of the state’s population (larger cities) or is, in aggregate (all cities 
revenues added together), a significant share of the state total revenues in that category.
Table 1A: Municipal Tax Authority
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Source notes: State-by-state information on local tax authority is drawn from four sources: 1. Critical Issues in State-Local 
Tax Policy: A Guide to Local Option Taxes (National Conference of State Legislatures, 1997); 2. Home Rule in America, 
by Dale Krane, et. al. (1999); 3. A survey of state municipal leagues conducted in 2007-08 and 2015; and 4. Updated 
information from state and local government websites conducted in 2014-15.
State # of Sources Notes
Connecticut 1 Property
Delaware 1 Property, income (Wilmington only)
Florida 1 Property
Hawaii 1 Property (Honolulu is only municipality in Hawaii)
Idaho 1 Property (sales for resort cities <10,000 pop.)
Maine 1 Property
Maryland 1 Property, income (Baltimore city-county only)
Massachusetts 1 Property
Mississippi 1 Property
Montana 1 Property (sales for resort cities <5,500 pop.)
Nevada 1 Property
New Hampshire 1 Property
New Jersey 1 Property (sales for Atlantic City, Wildwoods only)
North Carolina 1 Property
Oklahoma 1 Sales (property only for debt service)
Oregon 1 Property
Rhode Island 1 Property
South Carolina 1 Property
Vermont 1 Property (some sales)
West Virginia 1 Property
Wisconsin 1 Property
Wyoming 1 Property
Alaska 2 Property, sales
Arizona 2 Property (with voter approval), sales
California 2 Property, sales
Colorado 2 Property, sales
Georgia 2 Property, sales
Illinois 2 Property, sales
Indiana 2 Property, income
Iowa 2 Property, sales
Kansas 2 Property, sales
Kentucky 2 Income, property
Louisiana 2 Property, sales
Michigan 2 Property, income (22 cities)
Minnesota 2 Property, sales (some cities, if approved by State Leg.)
Nebraska 2 Property, sales
New Mexico 2 Property, sales
North Dakota 2 Property, sales
Ohio 2 Income, property
Pennsylvania 2 Property, income, sales (Philadelphia only)
South Dakota 2 Property, sales
Tennessee 2 Property, sales
Texas 2 Property, sales
Utah 2 Property, sales
Virginia 2 Property, sales
Alabama 3 Property, sales, income (19 cities)
Arkansas 3 Property, sales, income (not used by any municipality)
Missouri 3 Property, sales, income (Kansas City & St. Louis only)
New York 3 Property, sales, income (New York City & Yonkers only)
Washington 3 Property, sales, B&O (business income) tax
Table 1B: Municipal Tax Authority - Groups
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State Property Tax Sales Tax Income Tax Fees, Charges, & Misc. Total Own-Source Capacity
Alabama 11% 41% 2% 23% 77%
Alaska 25% 9% 0% 24% 58%
Arizona 8% 29% 0% 31% 68%
Arkansas 7% 28% 0% 39% 74%
California 25% 18% 0% 38% 80%
Colorado 10% 32% 0% 41% 84%
Connecticut 49% 0% 0% 8% 57%
Delaware 22% 2% 15% 34% 73%
Florida 24% 14% 0% 39% 77%
Georgia 19% 11% 0% 40% 70%
Hawaii 37% 16% 0% 26% 78%
Idaho 35% 2% 0% 42% 79%
Illinois 22% 16% 0% 29% 67%
Indiana 30% 1% 7% 34% 72%
Iowa 30% 7% 0% 40% 78%
Kansas 22% 20% 0% 42% 85%
Kentucky 13% 8% 25% 37% 82%
Louisiana 14% 28% 0% 30% 72%
Maine 46% 0% 0% 24% 71%
Maryland 28% 3% 6% 18% 55%
Massachusetts 44% 1% 0% 15% 60%
Michigan 29% 3% 5% 36% 73%
Minnesota 30% 4% 0% 45% 80%
Mississippi 17% 3% 0% 49% 69%
Missouri 9% 29% 6% 37% 81%
Montana 27% 1% 0% 43% 71%
Nebraska 18% 19% 0% 33% 70%
Nevada 16% 9% 0% 28% 54%
New Hampshire 51% 0% 0% 18% 68%
New Jersey 50% 1% 0% 15% 65%
New Mexico 9% 30% 0% 29% 67%
New York 22% 9% 16% 15% 61%
North Carolina 35% 13% 0% 32% 79%
North Dakota 13% 17% 0% 34% 65%
Ohio 8% 1% 38% 29% 76%
Oklahoma 5% 40% 0% 46% 91%
Oregon 33% 8% 0% 33% 74%
Pennsylvania 14% 8% 23% 21% 65%
Rhode Island 51% 1% 0% 15% 67%
South Carolina 26% 11% 0% 31% 67%
South Dakota 17% 33% 0% 36% 86%
Tennessee 23% 8% 0% 26% 57%
Texas 26% 24% 0% 39% 89%
Utah 19% 25% 0% 42% 86%
Vermont 37% 4% 0% 41% 83%
Virginia 30% 12% 0% 16% 57%
Washington 18% 25% 0% 38% 80%
West Virginia 10% 9% 0% 55% 74%
Wisconsin 38% 1% 0% 27% 66%
Wyoming 4% 3% 0% 26% 34%
U.S. Total 24% 13% 6% 28% 71%
Table 2A: Municipal Revenue Reliance & Capacity, 
as a % of General Revenue
Source Note: U.S. Census of Governments, 2012 
1. “General Revenue” is used as defined by the U.S. Census of Governments, including all local revenues except revenues from utilities and liquor store 
operations. The U.S. Census definition of “General Revenue” is broader than most cities’ definitions of “General Fund Revenue.” 2. Groups in Table 2B 
are delineated based on the mean and standard deviation for municipal own-source capacity. The mean is 71% and the standard deviation is 11%. 
Groups are separated based on whether they are one or two standard deviations from the mean (for instance, 71% +/- 11% for one standard devia-
tion). 3. The measure of “own-source revenue capacity” is determined by first assessing the local authority over a given tax source and, if that authority 
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Table 2B: Municipal Revenue Reliance & Capacity, 
as a % of General Revenue
State Property Tax Sales Tax Income Tax Fees, Charges, & Misc. Total Own-Source Capacity
Oklahoma 5% 40% 0% 46% 91%
Texas 26% 24% 0% 39% 89%
Utah 19% 25% 0% 42% 86%
South Dakota 17% 33% 0% 36% 86%
Kansas 22% 20% 0% 42% 85%
Colorado 10% 32% 0% 41% 84%
Vermont 37% 4% 0% 41% 83%
Kentucky 13% 8% 25% 37% 82%
Missouri 9% 29% 6% 37% 81%
Washington 18% 25% 0% 38% 80%
California 25% 18% 0% 38% 80%
Minnesota 30% 4% 0% 45% 80%
Idaho 35% 2% 0% 42% 79%
North Carolina 35% 13% 0% 32% 79%
Hawaii 37% 16% 0% 26% 78%
Iowa 30% 7% 0% 40% 78%
Alabama 11% 41% 2% 23% 77%
Florida 24% 14% 0% 39% 77%
Ohio 8% 1% 38% 29% 76%
West Virginia 10% 9% 0% 55% 74%
Arkansas 7% 28% 0% 39% 74%
Oregon 33% 8% 0% 33% 74%
Delaware 22% 2% 15% 34% 73%
Michigan 29% 3% 5% 36% 73%
Louisiana 14% 28% 0% 30% 72%
Indiana 30% 1% 7% 34% 72%
Montana 27% 1% 0% 43% 71%
Maine 46% 0% 0% 24% 71%
Georgia 19% 11% 0% 40% 70%
Nebraska 18% 19% 0% 33% 70%
Mississippi 17% 3% 0% 49% 69%
New Hampshire 51% 0% 0% 18% 68%
Arizona 8% 29% 0% 31% 68%
Rhode Island 51% 1% 0% 15% 67%
South Carolina 26% 11% 0% 31% 67%
New Mexico 9% 30% 0% 29% 67%
Illinois 22% 16% 0% 29% 67%
Wisconsin 38% 1% 0% 27% 66%
Pennsylvania 14% 8% 23% 21% 65%
New Jersey 50% 1% 0% 15% 65%
North Dakota 13% 17% 0% 34% 65%
New York 22% 9% 16% 15% 61%
Massachusetts 44% 1% 0% 15% 60%
Alaska 25% 9% 0% 24% 58%
Connecticut 49% 0% 0% 8% 57%
Virginia 30% 12% 0% 16% 57%
Tennessee 23% 8% 0% 26% 57%
Maryland 28% 3% 6% 18% 55%
Nevada 16% 9% 0% 28% 54%
Wyoming 4% 3% 0% 26% 34%
U.S. Total 24% 13% 6% 28% 71%
Mean 24% 13% 3% 32% 71%
Standard Deviation 11%
exists, counting that revenue toward the measure. Revenues from fees, charges, and miscellaneous revenue were then added since these sources are 
determined locally. The combined revenues, as a percentage of total general revenues, results in the “own-source revenue capacity” measure presented 
here. This measure differs from a commonly used U.S. census definition of “own-source revenues” in that local revenues are not counted as own source 
if there is no local authority using the definition (from Table 1) of authority based on a local option that can be used for general purposes. 4. The U.S. 
totals are the totals for all cities’ revenues added together for all states and are not averages/means.
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Table 3A: State Aid to Municipalities
Source note: U.S. Census of Governments, 2012
1. “General Revenue” is used as defined by the U.S. Census of Governments, including all local revenues except 
revenues from utilities and liquor store operations. The U.S. Census definition of “General Revenue” is broader than most 
cities’ definitions of “General Fund Revenue.” 2. “State aid” is defined as general revenues that cities receive from state 
governments. 3. Groups in Table 3B are delineated based on the mean and standard deviation for municipal own-source 
capacity. The mean is 17% and the standard deviation is 10%. Groups are separated based on whether they are one or 
two standard deviations from the mean (for instance, 17% +/- 10% for one standard deviation). 4. U.S. total is the total for 
all cities’ state aid added together for all states and is not an average/mean.
State % of Gen Rev Notes
Alabama 8%

















Maine 24% Includes schools
Maryland 32% Includes schools - Baltimore city/county only








New Hampshire 26% Includes schools
New Jersey 24% Includes schools
New Mexico 22%







Rhode Island 29% Includes schools
South Carolina 7%
South Dakota 8%
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State % of Gen Rev Notes
Wyoming 39%
Connecticut 39% Includes schools
Alaska 36% Includes schools
Massachusetts 35% Includes schools
Virginia 32% Includes schools
Maryland 32% Includes schools - Baltimore city/county only
New York 30% Includes schools
Rhode Island 29% Includes schools
North Dakota 27%
Nevada 26%
New Hampshire 26% Includes schools
Tennessee 25% Includes schools
Maine 24% Includes schools
Illinois 24%







































Table 3B: State Aid to Municipalities - Groups
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State Notes
Alabama Less binding property tax limit
Alaska Potentially binding property tax limit
Arizona Binding property tax limit + general limit
Arkansas Potentially binding property tax limit
California Binding property tax limit + general limit
Colorado Binding property tax limit + general limit
Connecticut No TELs
Delaware No TELs
Florida Potentially binding property tax limit
Georgia No TELs
Hawaii No TELs
Idaho Potentially binding property tax limit
Illinois Potentially binding property tax limit
Indiana Potentially binding property tax limit
Iowa Potentially binding property tax limit
Kansas Less binding property tax limit
Kentucky Potentially binding property tax limit
Louisiana Potentially binding property tax limit
Maine Potentially binding property tax limit
Maryland Less binding property tax limit
Massachusetts Potentially binding property tax limit
Michigan Potentially binding property tax limit
Minnesota Potentially binding property tax limit
Mississippi Potentially binding property tax limit
Missouri Potentially binding property tax limit
Montana Potentially binding property tax limit
Nebraska Binding property tax limit + general limit
Nevada Binding property tax limit + general limit
New Hampshire No TELs
New Jersey Binding property tax limit + general limit
New Mexico Potentially binding property tax limit
New York Potentially binding property tax limit
North Carolina Less binding property tax limit
North Dakota Potentially binding property tax limit
Ohio Potentially binding property tax limit
Oklahoma Potentially binding property tax limit
Oregon Potentially binding property tax limit
Pennsylvania Potentially binding property tax limit
Rhode Island Potentially binding property tax limit
South Carolina No TELs
South Dakota Potentially binding property tax limit
Tennessee No TELs
Texas Less binding property tax limit
Utah Less binding property tax limit
Vermont No TELs
Virginia No TELs
Washington Potentially binding property tax limit
West Virginia Potentially binding property tax limit
Wisconsin Potentially binding property tax limit
Wyoming Less binding property tax limit
Table 4A: Tax & Expenditure Limits (TELs) on Municipalities
Source notes: State-by-state information on local tax authority is drawn from the following sources: 1. National Conference of State Legislatures (various 
years); 2. Home Rule in America, by Dale Krane, et. al. (1999); 3. A survey of state municipal leagues conducted in 2007-08 and 2015; 4. The Lincoln 
Institute of Land Policy’s tracking of local property tax limits, and 5. Updated information from state and local government websites conducted in 2014-15.
1. At the local level, the most common tax and expenditure limits (TELs) affect local governments’ property taxes, while general revenue and spending 
limits are less common. Within property tax limitations, there are different distinctions that are based on types of limits. Three types of property tax limit 
exist: (1) those that seek to cap the property tax rate, (2) those that seek to limit growth in local property tax assessments, and (3) those that seek to 
limit the total levy (revenue) growth from property taxes from year to year. Not all of these types of limits are individually binding. A rate limit alone might 
be circumvented by raising assessments, or an assessment limit alone might be circumvented by raising the property tax rate. Therefore, “potentially 
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Alabama Less binding property tax limit
Kansas Less binding property tax limit
Maryland Less binding property tax limit
North Carolina Less binding property tax limit
Texas Less binding property tax limit
Utah Less binding property tax limit
Wyoming Less binding property tax limit
Alaska Potentially binding property tax limit
Arkansas Potentially binding property tax limit
Florida Potentially binding property tax limit
Idaho Potentially binding property tax limit
Illinois Potentially binding property tax limit
Indiana Potentially binding property tax limit
Iowa Potentially binding property tax limit
Kentucky Potentially binding property tax limit
Louisiana Potentially binding property tax limit
Maine Potentially binding property tax limit
Massachusetts Potentially binding property tax limit
Michigan Potentially binding property tax limit
Minnesota Potentially binding property tax limit
Mississippi Potentially binding property tax limit
Missouri Potentially binding property tax limit
Montana Potentially binding property tax limit
New Mexico Potentially binding property tax limit
New York Potentially binding property tax limit
North Dakota Potentially binding property tax limit
Ohio Potentially binding property tax limit
Oklahoma Potentially binding property tax limit
Oregon Potentially binding property tax limit
Pennsylvania Potentially binding property tax limit
Rhode Island Potentially binding property tax limit
South Dakota Potentially binding property tax limit
Washington Potentially binding property tax limit
West Virginia Potentially binding property tax limit
Wisconsin Potentially binding property tax limit
Arizona Binding property tax limit + general limit
California Binding property tax limit + general limit
Colorado Binding property tax limit + general limit
Nebraska Binding property tax limit + general limit
Nevada Binding property tax limit + general limit
New Jersey Binding property tax limit + general limit
binding” property tax limits are defined as those in which there is either a levy limit (because it caps the bottom line level of revenue growth allowed) 
or some combination of rate and assessment limits together, thereby negating the ability of localities to circumvent the limits. 2. General revenue and 
spending limits are considered potentially binding on their own because these limits create caps on year to year revenue and/or spending growth. 
3. Groupings in Table 4B are based on the combination of limits confronting cities in particular states. Cities with no TELs are, by defition, the least 
restricted. Cities confronting only less binding property tax limits (the ability to raise the rate or assessments) are less restricted than cities confronting 
potentially binding property tax limits. Cities with a combination of potentially binding property tax limits and general revenue/spending limit are 
considered to confront the most restrictions on their local authority. 4. The “less (or non-) binding/potentially binding” distinction is well-documented 
within the academic and analytical literature on TELs. For instance, see Mullins and Wallin in Public Budgeting and Finance (2005).
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